An independent report on the 2025 Palisades and Eaton wildfires, ordered by Gov. Gavin Newsom, has concluded that the outcomes were shaped by “multiple interlinked systems rather than any single factor or failure.” The analysis, conducted by UL Research Institutes’ Fire Safety Research Institute, has reignited long-standing criticisms of Los Angeles County agencies for their handling of the deadly disasters.
The report acknowledged California’s national leadership in wildfire policy, risk assessment, and investment. However, it highlighted a “critical disconnect between policy intent and on-the-ground implementation.” Days before the fires, the National Weather Service had issued extensive warnings about a historic wind event that helped spread the flames. Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass, who was out of town at the time, had initially said she wasn’t fully aware of the danger. The report cited “warning fatigue,” where frequent alerts can lead to reduced public responsiveness.
Despite numerous existing prevention, preparedness, and response programs — including defensible space inspections, fuels reduction, and extensive fire suppression resources — the report found that the “speed, scale, and complexity” of the Palisades and Eaton Fires “exceeded many assumptions underlying these systems.”
Public criticism following the fires often focused on evacuation efforts, particularly accusations that lower-income and minority areas of Altadena received less support than wealthier communities in the Pacific Palisades and nearby. The report detailed an “overly complex” public alert and warning process involving multiple public and private organizations with overlapping authorities. It also noted that some personnel lacked familiarity with key systems, while the Watch Duty app often relayed information more rapidly than official channels.
Specifically for the Eaton Fire, the report stated that Los Angeles County agencies, including LACoFD, LASD, and OEM, had policies that “did not fully address the processes and tasks needed for effective execution” for evacuation notifications and population movement. The evacuation order for areas west of Lake Avenue was issued as the fire was already impacting the area, leaving residents less time to self-evacuate. A significant number of those who died in both fires were older adults, and “early evacuation planning did not adequately account for vulnerable populations.”
Both city and county fire departments had pre-fire plans for the areas affected by the Palisades and Eaton fires, but these “were outdated and reportedly not used.” As the Eaton Fire burned into hours of darkness and backed into narrow canyons, personnel reportedly lost situational awareness, unable to visualize active fire areas. Secondary searches were not conducted as the fires progressed, “limiting rescue opportunities,” due to significant post-fire hazards and a lack of appropriate protective equipment. The report also found “longstanding gaps in law enforcement preparedness for rapidly evolving wildland-urban interface fires.”
The local group Altadena for Accountability swiftly responded to the report, using its findings to criticize Los Angeles County agencies. Shawna Dawson Beer, a fire survivor, said residents “knew our town was left to burn” and that neighbors were left without warnings, resources, or a chance to escape, leading to deaths in their homes. The group stated it would continue to follow California Attorney General Rob Bonta’s civil rights investigation into whether West Altadena experienced a different response than other communities.
The report also highlighted other systemic issues. It found an absence of a single entity responsible for coordinating landscape-scale wildfire mitigation, leading to fragmented implementation across different jurisdictions. While water storage systems were filled to capacity and utilities had backup power, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) did not increase pre-event staff in preparation for the extreme fire weather. When water tenders were requested by the Los Angeles Fire Department, drivers had to travel from their homes to facilities to retrieve, check, and fuel up their assigned tenders, a process that took several hours.
Additionally, the Santa Ynez Reservoir, though not required for daily service, was empty and could have provided extra water for fire suppression. Some water utility structures, particularly tanks with wooden roofs, burned, and fire hydrants lost pressure in several locations. Drinking water was also contaminated during and after the fires. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department maintained normal patrol staffing on January 7, 2025, with no increased operational staffing in preparation for the extreme fire risk. Both city and county emergency management systems were described as “under-resourced and understaffed.” Local jurisdictions were operating under fire hazard maps from 2007, with updated hazard classifications not issued until after the fires. Information around preparedness, evacuation, and rebuilding was distributed across multiple agencies, making it difficult for residents to locate, especially for renters, vulnerable populations, and non-English speakers. Finally, communication systems, including radio, cellular, and dispatch, were quickly overwhelmed. The LAFD was also criticized for not holding over personnel who were about to end their shifts, despite the already-present heavy wind and fire danger.
