A comprehensive independent investigation, commissioned by Gov. Gavin Newsom, has revealed significant failures in the official response to the Eaton and Palisades fires in January 2025. The UL Research Institutes’ Fire Safety Research Institute released its 724-page report Friday, providing the most in-depth review of the catastrophes that killed 31 people and destroyed over 16,000 structures across Southern California.
The report describes widespread chaos and poor communication, which severely hampered evacuation efforts, rescue operations, and firefighting in exceptionally dangerous conditions. Derek Alkonis, senior research program manager at the Fire Safety Research Institute, noted at a Thursday press briefing that Southern California in January had put fire officials, despite being among the “well-trained firefighters in the world,” in an incredibly difficult situation, with the region “primed and ready to release all of that stored-up energy.”
In the Eaton fire, which occurred on January 7, 2025, in Altadena, the L.A. County Fire Department, the agency leading the incident, failed to formally organize evacuation operations within its command structure. Critically, reports of an ember-storm witnessed by paramedics in west Altadena never reached incident commanders. A paramedic squad, responding to Glenrose and West Loma Alta Drive, described seeing "embercast 'like snow' and structures on fire." However, this squad operated independently and was not assigned to the fire incident, meaning their crucial observations were not relayed to commanders.
More than three hours before the first widespread evacuation alert reached west Altadena, L.A. County Sheriff’s Department officers were actively warning residents door-to-door and using PA systems. Yet, a general evacuation order for most of western Altadena was not issued until 3:25 a.m. on January 8, more than four hours after the first 911 call west of Lake Avenue and several hours after sheriff’s deputies had observed fire in the area. This historically Black neighborhood, which received delayed alerts, suffered heavily, with all but one of the 19 Eaton fire fatalities occurring there. The report found that the circumstances of several deaths suggested individuals may not have been aware of the fire’s proximity or their evacuation status, underscoring the importance of early warnings for vulnerable populations.
The Palisades fire, which erupted from the Lachman fire in Pacific Palisades on January 7, also stemmed from critical oversights. The Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) had initially contained the Lachman fire in Topanga State Park on January 1 but failed to act on multiple warnings that it was still smoldering. The investigation found no evidence that the LAFD monitored the burn area as dangerous fire weather approached.
After the initial containment, California State Parks representatives requested that a trail cut to reach the fire be re-covered and that a hose left in the area be removed. Despite an LAFD captain’s concerns that removing the hose might be premature given potential for further mop-up, and a firefighter paramedic identifying a hot spot and expressing concern about control lines, a battalion chief ordered the hose removed anyway. The LAFD later received a report of smoke on January 3 but found nothing upon arrival.
The report highlighted that LAFD leaders overseeing the initial Palisades fire response lacked experience with large, complex wildland fires, which led to other agencies operating independently rather than coordinating efforts. Incident commanders also reportedly lost the confidence of ground personnel. The investigation found that the LAFD lacked comprehensive mop-up procedures for wildland fires, contributing to inconsistencies in confirming containment and when areas were deemed safe. The report recommends that the LAFD prioritize a culture that empowers firefighters to inform supervisors about hot spots and other concerns, ensuring these are thoroughly evaluated.
